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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by finding 
the state had provided sufficient evidence to establish that the 
defendant had obtained unauthorized control over Ella Stevens' 
property? 
II. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by finding 
the state had provided sufficient evidence to establish that the 
defendant had intended to deprive Mrs. Stevens of her property? 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Over the past few years defendant, Carol Fowler, has lived 
next door to Ella Stevens (R. 87). During this time defendant 
and Mrs. Stevens became well acquainted and were good friends (R. 
85, 133). From the year 1984 to 1986 defendant visited Mrs. 
Stevens almost daily, perceiving her to be a lonely widow in need 
of company (R. 100, 138). Mrs. Stevens accepted and treated 
defendant like a mother would treat her daughter (R. 133). 
During the same period of time, defendant owned several pet 
rabbits which she kept in her yard. Because of her financial 
disabilities, defendant was finding it difficult to provide food 
1 
for the rabbits (R. 87). Mrs. Stevens noticed the rabbits were 
undernourished and questioned defendant about it. Defendant 
informed Mrs. Stevens that she was unable to afford food for the 
rabbits. Mrs. Stevens offered to pay for the rabbits1 food and 
give defendant small amounts of cash weekly for this purpose (R. 
104). 
This prompted the defendant to ask Mrs. Stevens for money 
for other purposes also. She being shy about asking Mrs. Stevens 
face to face for the money, would write letters explaining that 
she needed cash to pay for traffic fines, automobile repairs, 
animal care and other living expenses (R. 83, 88). Some of these 
needs were legitimate and some were mere excuses for more money. 
Mrs. Stevens kept a running total of all money borrowed by the 
defendant, and both Mrs. Stevens and defendant viewed the cash 
advances as a loan which defendant would some day pay back. 
Defendant has in fact made some payments on the loan totaling 
approximately $1,500 (R. 83). 
Defendant has accumulated over the two years a debt of over 
$70,000.00 (R. 141, 146). Mrs. Stevens has never shown signs of 
aggravation concerning defendant's debt; in fact, she has always 
been willing to loan defendant even more money (R. 85). This 
suit came about by Mrs. Stevens1 bank notifying Payson City 
Police Department that Mrs. Stevens was regularly writing checks 
in defendant's name, totalling significant amounts of money (R. 
106, 109, 110). 
Upon further investigation by Payson City Police, the State 
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brought suit against defendant for a violation of Section 76-6-
404 of the Utah Code Annotated. On the 27th day of March, 
1986, defendant appeared before the Honorable Cullen Y. 
Christensen (R. 80) in the Fourth Judicial District Court where 
she was found guilty of the charge of theft. Subsequently notice 
of appeal was filed in the Utah County Clerk's Office on May 
30th, 1986. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed prejudicial error by finding the 
State had provided sufficient evidence to establish that the 
defendant obtained unauthorized control over Ella Stevens' 
property, as required under Section 76-6-404 of the Utah Code 
Annotated. Mrs. Stevens, at all times, willingly endorsed checks 
in the defendant's name. The relationship between the defendant 
and Mrs. Stevens was similar to that of a mother and daughter (R. 
133), causing Mrs. Stevens to feel sorrow for defendant and her 
financial troubles and prompting her to temporarily ease the pain 
by loaning defendant money. 
The trial curt further erred prejudicially when it found 
that the State had provided sufficient evidence to show that the 
defendant intended to deprive Mrs. Stevens of her property. Both 
the defendant and Mrs. Stevens viewed the money advancements as a 
loan, which the defendant would pay back as soon as she was 
financially able to do so (R. 90). Defendant has made some 
payments on the loan totaling approximately $1,500.00. Although 
this is a minimal amount, it does show defendant's intentions 
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concerning Mrs. Stevens' money advancements. In fact, defendant 
has recently found employment (R. 143) at a position where she 
can feasibly pay back the entire $70,200.00 over the next several 
years, and defendant fully intends to do just that (R. 141, 146). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE STATE HAD PROVIDED 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DEFENDANT 
OBTAINED UNAUTHORIZED CONTROL OVER ELLA STEVENS1 PROPERTY 
It is the defendants position that the State has failed to 
prove essential elements of the crime of theft as defined in 
Section 76-6-404, of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended, which 
states: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with 
a purpose to deprive him thereof. (Emphasis added) 
This implies that the crime of theft requires a felonious taking 
of the property of another. Considering the facts at hand, one 
finds that Mrs. Stevens consented to loaning money to defendant 
(R. 85). Defendant did not coerce, threaten, or force Mrs. 
Stevens in any way to loan her money, she merely asked Mrs. 
Stevens for it and Mrs. Stevens parted with it willingly. Its 
true that defendant did at times lie about her needs for which 
the money was to be used, but she did this only because she was 
shy about asking for loans and felt that Mrs. Stevens would ask 
less questions if defendant's needs were related to general 
living expenses. When defendant asked Mrs. Stevens for money, 
she gave it of her own free will regardless of defendant's need 
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for it. 
Returning to the wording of Section 76-6-404, it becomes 
obvious that if the taking of another's property is with that 
person's consent, then no crime of theft is established 
regardless of whether the "obtainer" has a purpose to deprive the 
owner thereof. Such was the finding of the Utah Supreme Court in 
the case of State v. Franks, 649 P.2d 3 (Utah, 1982). The 
defendant in this case, was charged with auto theft and 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
for value. A jury convicted Franks of possession of a controlled 
substance and second degree felony auto theft. Franks appealed 
his conviction for theft. The facts indicated that defendant had 
been apprehended by a highway patrolman for speeding in Sevier 
County, Utah. Defendant was driving a Cadillac with Tennessee 
license plates and could not produce a driver's license or 
certificate of title. After an investigation the officer 
discovered that the car belonged to a Garland Smith, whom the car 
was subsequently returned to. At trial, the only evidence going 
to the theft charge was the testimony of the arresting officer 
essentially as to those facts as set forth above. The defendant 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence at trial as to the 
conviction of theft, contending the State had not proved that he 
exercised unauthorized control over the property. To this the 
Supreme Court said: 
...We agree. Although the elements of an offense may 
be established by direct or circumstantial evidence, 
the evidence adduced in this case was de minimus and 
therefore insufficient to support a conviction of 
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theft. We deem this to be so notwithstanding the 
usual deference given the verdict of the jury. The 
State contends that there is no evidence that the 
owner consented to defendant's control of the vehicle. 
That is true but the burden is on the State to show 
unauthorized control, not on the defendant to show 
authorized control. (Emphasis added). IdT at 4. 
Returning to the case at hand, the State has failed to offer any 
evidence that defendant's obtaining of Mrs. Stevens' money was 
unauthorized. In fact, the State's evidence has proven the 
contrary, the State admits that Mrs. Stevens voluntarily advanced 
money to the defendant. Therefore, the State has fallen short of 
its legally imposed burden of proof. It has only proven that 
defendant obtained Mrs. Stevens property. The mere obtaining of 
property by itself is not suggestive of a crime. It is the 
unauthorized control of one's property that makes the action 
criminal. Thus, defendant contends that the State has failed in 
its proof that defendant exercised or obtained unauthorized 
control over the property of Ella Stevens. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE STATE HAD PROVIDED 
'SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE DEFENDANT HAD THAT 
THE INTENT TO DEPRIVE ELLA STEVENS OF HER PROPERTY. 
D e f e n d a n t f u r t h e r c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o 
e s t a b l i s h a s e c o n d e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e of t h e f t , t h a t of 
" p u r p o s e t o d e p r i v e . " The S t a t e has c h a r g e d t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h 
c o m m i t t i n g t h e o f f e n s e o v e r a p e r i o d o f t w o y e a r s . I n 
d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t a c t e d w i t h t h e p u r p o s e of 
d e p r i v i n g E l l a S t e v e n s of h e r p r o p e r t y one mus t c o n s i d e r a l l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h a t two y e a r p e r i o d . 
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As has been previously discussed Ella regularly gave 
different amounts of cash to defendant upon defendant's request. 
Defendant stated several different times that she planned on 
paying the money back. In fact, defendant even set dates when 
she would pay back a specific sum. Although she did not always 
succeed in paying the stated amount on the set day, she did 
manage to pay back somewhere between $1,500.00 and $1,700.00. 
Defendant's payments on the loan, although minimal, expressed an 
intention of returning the money. Likewise, Mrs. Stevens keeping 
a running total of all money borrowed, conveyed her intention 
that the sum would be returned. 
Another interesting point is that Ella Stevens did not 
initiate the suit. In other words, Mrs. Stevens never became so 
aggravated at defendant's pleas for money that she decided to 
take legal action against her. On the contrary, Mrs. Stevens was 
fond of the defendant and trusted that she would pay back the 
money as she was able. This prosecution came about by Mrs. 
Stevens' bank noticing the defendant drawing substantial amounts 
of cash from Mrs. Stevens' account. 
Again, the State has failed to supply any evidence that the 
defendant intended to deprive Mrs. Stevens of her money, except 
for the fact that defendant at times falsely expressed her needs 
for the cash. Defendant only expressed false needs to Mrs. 
Stevens because she was embarrassed about asking for more money. 
Defendant felt if she could make Mrs. Stevens feel the money was 
being used for legitimate living expenses she would part with it 
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without asking a lot of questions. 
Defendant and Mrs. Stevens both perceived the cash 
advancements as a loan. Defendant has at all times expressed an 
intent to pay back the money, and has just recently received some 
steady employment which will provide her the means to do so. 
Since defendant at her current employment will be able to pay 
back, over the next several years, the entire $70,200.00, she 
obviously has not intended to deprive Mrs. Stevens of her money, 
and the State has failed to produce any other evidence proving 
defendant had the required criminal mens rea. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, defendant seeks reversal of her conviction for 
theft. Defendant respectfully contends the trial court erred in 
finding the State had provided sufficient evidence to prove 
essential elements of the crime of theft as defined under Section 
76-6-404 of the Utah Code Annotated; namely, exercising 
unauthorized control over another's property and also the intent 
to deprive that person thereof. 
Respectfully submitted this /^^-day of /fpn I , 1987. qfb 
G'kMJt. WEIGHT 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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DECEIVED MAR 2 8 m$ 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROL FOWLER, 
Defendant* 
This matter came on duly and regularly for trial 
before the Court sitting without a jury at the specific 
request of the defendant. The plaintiff appeared and was 
represented by counsel Kent M. Barry, Esq. The defendant 
appeared and was represented by counsel Gary H. Weight, Esq. 
The Court thereupon heard the evidence adduced by the parties 
in support of their respective positions, reviewed the 
memoranda of counsel and upon being advised in the premises, 
now finds beyond a reasonable doubt as follows: 
1. (a) That during the two years immediately 
prior to December 1985, the defendant obtained from Ella 
Stevens the approximate sum of $70,200.00. 
(b) That such money was obtained in Utah 
County, Utah. 
(c) That defendant contends that such sum was 
obtained from Ella Stevens as loans. 
(d) That during said period of time the defen-
Case No. CR-86-4 
DECISION 
-2-
flag person for approximately two months early in 1984. 
(e) That Ella Stevens, a widow, is now 84 years 
old and resides next door to the defendant. 
(f) That the defendant during such two year 
period visited almost daily with Ella Stevens thereby in-
gratiating herself to Ella Stevens. 
(g) That defendant represented to Ella Stevens 
that defendant was gainfully employed and had the means to 
repay said money within a reasonable time; that such repre-
sentations were false; that defendant repeatedly lied to Ella 
Stevens about the need and purpose for which defendant sought 
money from Ella Stevens; that defendant repeatedly falsified 
records and receipts for the purpose of concealing from Ella 
Stevens the real purposes for which said money was obtained 
by the defendant from said victim; that defendant knew there 
was no realistic possibility that defendant would be able to 
repay said money to the victim and defendant's assertions to 
the victim that such money would be repaid were nothing 
more than a fraud and a sham to facilitate obtaining money 
from the victim and to deprive the victim thereof; that 
defendant was aware that her promises to repay said money 
to the victim were reasonably certain not to be performed 
and the defendant thus obtained such money from the victim 
with the purpose to deprive the victim thereof. (76-6-401 
UCA; State v. Walker 658 P.2d 16) 
2. The Court therefore finds that the defendant 
—
J
 - — « « A « O K 1 O Hnnht of the charge contained 
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in the Information. 
3. Defendant is ordered to appear before the 
Court for the imposition of sentence on the 4th day of April 
1986 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
Dated this -Jl~7 l^ day of March 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
W&Z&n*£rt) 
Cullen Yj/ Christensen, Judge 
cc: County Attorney 
Gary H. Weight, Atty. 
